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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(2)(j) and the
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
1.

Is the February 2004 independent investigative report ("Investigative

Report" or "Report") commissioned by Salt Lake County concerning whether the Chief
Deputy County Clerk engaged in persistent and egregious sexual harassment of
subordinate employees, and what County officials knew and did about such misconduct, a
public record under GRAMA?
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a
public record under GRAMA presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court. See Young v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT 70, \ 5,
52 P.3d 1240, 1242; R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2004 UT
48, f 7, 100 P.3d 1159, 1161; Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, % 20, 70
P.3dl,6.
2*

Did the trial court err in concluding that the Investigative Report is properly

classified as a private record under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d)?
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a
private record pursuant to Utah Code § 63-2-302(2)(d) presents a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See id.
-1 185229 2

classified ,r- J pM^I'vled MVOKI \\\u\v\ 1 1Mb (1ode ^ 63-2-304(9)?
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a
protected record under Utah Code § 63-2-304(9) presents a question u) law uu;
reviewed for correctness, giving no defei . .
4.

I) I iilin1 in il " nun! i n in lii'liii" in segregate any information in the

In vesti native Report that may properly be classified as non-public from information that
is public and order release of a redacted version of the Investigative Report containing the
public information '
H
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah's open records statute - the Utah Government Records Access and
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101, et seq. ("GRAMA") - is of central
importance to this appeal and is set forth verbatim in Tab E of the accompanying
Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This case concerns whether the public and press are entitled under GRAMA to

learn the contents of an independently commissioned investigative report that
substantiated allegations of official misconduct by a high-ranking Salt Lake County
official. In September 2004, a Morning News reporter filed a GRAMA request for the
independent Investigative Report, which concerned allegations that Chief Deputy County
Clerk Nick Floros engaged in a pattern of egregious and persistent sexual harassment of a
subordinate employee, Marcia Rice, and possibly other County employees, and that
County officials knew about the misconduct but continued to employ him. The County
denied the request. After appealing the denial through three levels of administrative
review within the County - and being denied at each level - the Morning News initiated
this action seeking access to the Investigative Report.
The Morning News' Complaint requests the following relief: (i) that the Court
declare that the Investigative Report is a public record under GRAMA and order its

-3185229 2

immediate release, (ii) to the extent the Court determines the Investigative Report
contains some information properly classified as non-public under GRAMA, that the
Court order redaction of the non-public information and release of the public information,
and (iii) if the Court finds that the County properly classified the Investigative Report, in
its entirety, as "private" or "protected" under GRAMA, that the Court order release of the
Report pursuant to Section 404(8) of GRAMA because the public interests in disclosure
outweigh the interests in nondisclosure.
The Morning News and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
the issue of whether the Investigative Report was properly classified a private or
protected record under GRAMA. In its Memorandum Decision entered April 5, 2006, the
trial court held that the Investigative Report was properly classified as a private or
protected record and, consequently, granted the County's motion and denied the Morning
Newsy motion. The Morning News appeals this order.1

1

By Order dated May 11, 2006, the trial court certified its Memorandum Decision
as a final order for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Certification Order"). (R. 608). The trial court's Memorandum Decision
and Certification Order wholly disposed of the Morning News' First Claim for Relief and
finally adjudicated the issue of the proper classification, under GRAMA, of the
Investigative Report. So that the Memorandum Decision could be certified properly as a
final order for purposes of this appeal, the Morning News dismissed without prejudice its
claim that the Investigative Report, even if properly classified, should be released
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(8). The only claims pending in the trial court are
the Morning News' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, which
are wholly dependent upon resolution of the issues presented in this appeal.
-4185229.2

II.

Statement of Facts.
A.

Marcia Rice's Allegations of Sexual Harassment Against Chief Deputy
Clerk P. Nick Floros.

In November 2003, Marcia Rice, an employee in the Salt Lake County Clerk's
Office (the "Clerk's Office"), filed a written complaint of sexual harassment against P.
Nick Floros, the Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Clerk (R. 314 at viii (citing R. 329); see
also R. 127-28 & attachment thereto). Rice supplemented her initial complaint by filing a
follow-up report in November 2003 and a Notice of Claim in July 2004. (R. 314 at viii
(citing R. 329); see also R. 127-28 & attachment thereto at 1; R. 441). Rice claimed that
Floros helped her obtain a position in the Clerk's Office for which she was not qualified
and then engaged in a persistent pattern of improper sexual advances and sexual
harassment. (Id.).
Among other things, Rice alleged that Floros (i) during work hours removed his
penis from his pants, rubbed it and asked Rice to perform oral sex and engage in other
sexual conduct with him; (ii) asked Rice about her sexual relationships and made
numerous comments to her of a sexual nature, including that he fantasized about her all
the time and got an erection every time she walked into the room; (iii) called Rice at
home to discuss work-related topics and would then discuss the pornographic film he was
watching, describe to her what was happening, and invite her to engage in similar
behavior; (iv) on at least one occasion, walked up behind Rice in her office, began
rubbing her shoulders, leaned down and started kissing her neck while he simultaneously
- 5185229.2

reached his hands down the front of Rice's dress and fondled her breasts; and (v) on
several occasions, indicated to Rice that he had an erection. (R. 314 at viii-ix (citing R.
441-42); see also R. 353-54; R. 371).
Rice claimed that Floros punished and retaliated against her when she did not
return his advances. (R. 314 at viii-ix (citing R. 329-31, R. 441-42)). Rice further
alleged that Floros had previously engaged in similar behavior with at least one other
female County employee and that County officials knew about Floros' improper behavior
but continued to employ him. (R. 314 at ix (citing R. 441)). Rice's initial complaint was
brought to the attention of Sherrie Swensen, Salt Lake County Clerk. (R. 314 at ix (citing
R. 329)). Swensen advised Floros that a complaint had been filed and placed him on
administrative leave pending a final determination of the allegations. (Id.).
B.

The Partial Summary of the Independent Investigation and Report
Contained in the Soltis Letter.

Because of County Clerk Swensen's "long-term professional relationship with
Floros and her goal of complete objectivity and fair play," she delegated the investigation
of Rice's allegations to the Litigation Division of the Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office, headed by District Attorney David E. Yocum. (R. 314 at x (citing R.
329)). Both Swensen and Yocum were elected to their respective offices on the
Democratic Party ticket. In a further effort "to maintain complete objectivity and fair
play/' the District Attorney's Office commissioned an independent panel to investigate
the allegations (Id.). The County hired "two extremely competent and respected
-6185229.2

employment attorneys" to conduct the investigation and prepare written findings,
conclusions and recommendations. (Id.).
In February 2004, after more than 100 hours of investigation and the expenditure
of approximately $11,000 in taxpayer funds, the independent investigators completed
their report (the "Investigative Report") and delivered it to the District Attorney's Office.
(R. 314 at x (citing R. 329); see also R. 340 & Tab 2 thereto). On February 11, 2004,
John Soltis, Director of the District Attorney's Litigation Division, sent Rice a letter (the
"Soltis Letter") purporting to summarize the independent investigators' findings and
recommendations and to report the administrative action to be taken by the County in
response to such findings and recommendations. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329)). The
Soltis Letter is a public record, and its content was extensively reported by the local news
media. (R. 314 at xxi-xxiii (citing R. 323, 329-40); see also R. 351-52).
Soltis stated in his letter that he found the Investigative Report "to be very well
reasoned, fair and complete^]" (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 330)). Among other things, the
Soltis Letter reported the following:
•

the investigators concluded that the evidence substantiated Rice's

complaint;
•

the investigators concluded that Floros had engaged in unwelcome sexual

conduct and advances toward Rice and punished her for not reciprocating;
•

Floros' conduct constituted "egregious violations" of County policy;

-7185229.2

•

the investigators would have recommended that Floros be immediately

terminated and considered ineligible for future employment with the County; Floros,
however, retired just three days before the investigators delivered their report; and
•

because Floros retired, "administrative-disciplinary action based on the

investigators' findings and recommendation is presently unnecessary." (Id.).
Although the Soltis Letter stated that the investigators also focused their
investigation on the employment history of the parties, management style, treatment of
subordinates, and "appropriate management response/' the letter reported no findings,
conclusions or recommendations of the investigators concerning those subject matters.
(R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-31)). Specifically, the Soltis Letter reported no information
concerning whether the investigators looked into Rice's allegations that Floros sexually
harassed other subordinate female employees and that County managers knew about such
misconduct but refused to do anything about it. (Id.).
C.

The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Investigative
Report.

[See "SEALED SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT CONCERNING CONTENT OF
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT" (Submitted Under Seal).]2

2

Pursuant to the trial court's Order Granting the Morning Newsy Motion to
Compel and for Entry of a Protective Order (Aug. 30, 2005) and Protective Order (Aug.
30, 2005) (R. 208, 234), Section C of this Statement of Facts, describing the content of
the Investigative Report that has not been made public, and Section IV of the Argument
are submitted separately under seal.
-8185229 2

D.

The Public Controversy Concerning the Floros Investigation.

The Floros investigation became the subject of a heated political controversy
among members of the Salt Lake County Council. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 322-24,
R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). According to the Soltis Letter, the District Attorney's Office
retained the independent attorney investigators to conduct the Floros investigation "[i]n
an effort to maintain complete objectivity and fair play." (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)).
Questions were raised, however, after the District Attorney's Office refused to release the
independent Investigative Report upon its completion. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R.
322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). Local newspaper reports quoted Republican Council
members charging that District Attorney Yocum soft-pedaled the investigation because
Floros was a friend and fellow Democrat. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 347)). Republican
Council members compared Yocum's handling of the Nancy Workman case, in which
former County Mayor Workman (a Republican) was charged with felony misuse of public
funds, with his handling of the Floros case, in which Floros (a Democrat) was allowed to
quietly retire just days before the independent Investigative Report was issued. (R. 314 at
xxii (citing R. 341-45)).
District Attorney Yocum and Democratic Council members defended the
investigation, responding that a criminal investigation or prosecution of Floros was
unwarranted because Rice was not interested in pursuing criminal charges, a claim that
Rice, through her attorney, disputed. (Id.). Ultimately, although the County Council met

-9185229 2

in closed session to discuss whether to conduct its own investigation into Yocum's
handling of the Floros matter, no such investigation was conducted. (Id.; see also R. 34850).
E.

The EEOC Determination of Discrimination and Rice's Federal
Lawsuit Against Salt Lake County, Swensen, and Floros.

On July 14, 2004, Rice filed a Notice of Claim against the County advising that
she intended to pursue claims against the County and Floras, describing, in detail, Floras'
alleged misconduct, charging that Floros engaged in similar misconduct with at least one
other female County employee, and that County officials knew of Floras' misconduct but
continued to employ him. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42)).
On July 30, 2004, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued its
determination on the merits of Rice's sexual harassment complaint (the "EEOC
Determination"). The EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the
County discriminated against Rice by sexually harassing her, and retaliated against her
and "at least one other individual by harassing them when they rejected a supervisor's
sexual advances, in violation of Title VII." (R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 353-54)).
On October 6, 2004, Rice filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the County,
County Clerk Swensen, and Floros, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. (Id.
(citing R. 355-73)). Rice alleged in her complaint that Swensen hired Floros knowing
that he had a history of harassing behavior toward other Salt Lake County employees.
(Id. (citing R. 358)). Rice further alleged that after hiring Floros, Swensen was
-10185229.2

specifically informed in writing that Floros was "creating a hostile environment" by
"inappropriate touching and invasion of 'personal space'" and "continual, improper and
uncalled for staring and watching employees." Rice alleged that Swensen did nothing to
prevent Floros5 alleged misconduct or to protect subordinate employees. (Id.).
Rice's Notice of Claim, the EEOC Determination, and Rice's Complaint in the
federal court proceeding are public records that were extensively reported upon by the
local news media. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 353-54);
Id (citing 355-73); R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). In
addition, during the federal court litigation, the County produced copies of the
Investigative Report to Rice, Floros, Swensen, and their respective counsel pursuant to a
stipulated protective order that required the parties to keep the Report confidential. (R.
314 at xxv (citing R. 159-73); R. 134 n. 2).
Rice and the County subsequently settled the federal lawsuit, with the County
paying Rice and her attorney nearly $100,000.00. (R. 555 at Tab 17).
F.

The Morning News' GRAMA Request for the Investigative Report and
Judicial Appeal of Denial.

In September 2004 - eight months after Floros retired from the County and at the
height of the political controversy surrounding the District Attorney's handling of the
Floros investigation - the Morning News submitted a GRAMA request to the County for
a copy of the Investigative Report. (R. 314 at xxv-xxvi (citing R. 3, 28)). The County
denied the request, claiming the Report was properly classified as a "private" or
-11185229 2

"protected" record under GRAMA. (Id.). The Morning News appealed the denial
through three levels of administrative review within the County, and was denied at each
level. (R. 314 at xxvi-xxviii (citing R. 6, 12-15, 322-26, 374-73)). Despite the Morning
News' request, nongjjf the County GRAMA appeal authorities actually reviewed the
Investigative Report before ruling on the merits gLtJie Morning News' appeal. (Id.).
On December 14, 2004, during the final administrative appeal hearing before the
Salt Lake County Council, counsel for the Morning News requested that the Council
conduct an in camera review of the Report to determine whether the record was properly
classified under GRAMA. (R. 314 at xxvii (citing R. 467); see also R. 4 ^ 10; R. 28 f 5).
The District Attorney's Office objected, however, stating that the District Attorney would
seek a court order preventing the Council from reviewing the Investigative Report. (R.
314 at xxviii (citing R. 467); see also R. 12 at 2).
On December 21, 2004, the County Council reconvened and determined that an in
camera review of the Report by the Council was appropriate and necessary (i) to
determine whether the Report was properly classified; (ii) to comply with the Council's
statutory duty to segregate and release information that the requester is entitled to inspect;
and (iii) to weigh the various interests and public policies favoring disclosure and
nondisclosure of the Report (R. 314 at xxviii (citing 472-73); see also R. 12-13).
However, to avoid the substantial delay and expense associated with litigation over the
issue of whether the Council had the right to review the Investigative Report, and to
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expedite judicial consideration of the merits of the Morning News' GRAMA appeal, the
Council issued an order, stipulated to by the Morning News and the District Attorney's
Office, denying the Morning News' GRAMA appeal and certifying such order as final for
purposes of petitioning the District Court for relief {Id.).
On January 12, 2005, the Morning News filed its Complaint seeking judicial
review of the County's denial of its GRAMA request, as provided under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-402(1 )(b) and 63-2-404. The Morning News sought a judicial declaration that the
Investigative Report is a public record and ordering the County to release it. (R. 9-10).
The Morning News and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the
issue of whether the Investigative Report was properly classified a private or protected
record under GRAMA. (R. 308-14, R. 555).
G.

The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision.

On April 5, 2006 - more than a year-and-a-half after the Morning News submitted
its GRAMA request for the Investigative Report - the trial court issued its Memorandum
Decision ruling that the Report was properly classified as a private or protected record.
Consequently, the court granted the County's motion and denied the Morning News9
motion. (R. 593-602; see also Tab D to Addendum).
The trial court based its ruling on two conclusions. First, in finding that release of
the Investigative Report would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy under Section 302(2)(d) of GRAMA, the court asserted that it was Floros whose

-13185229 2

privacy would be unjustly invaded if the Report - which substantiated allegations about
Floras' misconduct as & public official - were released. This conclusion was notbased^oa^
a finding that the Report contained baseless allegations about Floras, but rather on the

—

***** ^ *V

h

\«>clfr

fact that the Report was independent and credible. The court stated, "[rjeason dictates

^

e»*

that there exists within the contents of the full investigative report more express
information concerning the alleged perpetrator [Floras] than exists in the Soltis letter, and
more even-handed findings than can be found in the allegations contained in the [Marcia
Rice] federal [lawsuit] or EEOC complaints. This is information, unique to the
investigative report, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted^

AN* »\v *~U ^&S
7
t>

^ "^

invasion of the alleged perpetrator's privacy;" (R. 593 (emphasis added)). Accordingly,
the trial court concluded the Investigative Report was properly classified as a private
record under Section 302(2)(d) of GRAMA.
Second, even though the investigation into Floras' conduct had long been
concluded, and even though the County did not identify any specific investigation that
would be compromised by release of the Report, the trial court held that release of the
Investigative Report "reasonably could be expected to interfere" with future
investigations or disciplinary or enforcement proceedings, meaning the Report was
properly classified as a protected record under Section 304(9) of GRAMA. (R. 599-600).
This conclusion was based on the trial court's sweeping assertion that, "in the public's
eyes," a determination that this specific Investigative Report was public would carry "an
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implication that there is a chance that all such investigative reports could be made public
as well, depending upon how badly the information is wanted/' thus possibly chilling the
participation of witnesses and victims in unspecified future sexual harassment
investigations. (R. 600).
Although requested by the Morning News, the trial court did not address the issue
of whether a redacted version of the Investigative Report could be released that
segregated any non-public information and disclosed the public information, as provided
in Section 307 of GRAMA. (R. 314 at 11; R. 593-602).
The trial court's Memorandum Decision is the subject of this appeal. (R. 612-13).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's refusal to order release of the Investigative Report - a document
of manifest public interest about official misconduct and the operation of County
government - was clearly incorrect. Neither of the two exceptions cited by the trial court
permits the County to keep the Report from the public.
First, the trial court erred in concluding that the Report is "private" because its
release would constitute a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of Floros' personal privacy.
The Report is not about Floros' personal life; it is about his alleged abuse of a public
office, as well as whether County officials knew about such misconduct and ignored it.
As such, the Report bears directly on "the conduct of the public's business." See Utah
Code Ann. 63-2-102(l)(a). The significant public interest in disclosure of the Report,
-15185229.2

which the trial court failed to consider, far outweighs the privacy interests, if any, in
secrecy.
Second, the trial court erred in concluding that the Report is "protected" because
its release would interfere with future sexual harassment investigations. From the time
the Report was first requested until the Court ruled on this matter, there was no pending
investigation of Floros, nor did the County submit evidence of any other investigation or
proceeding that would be compromised by release of the Report. Speculative interference
with unspecified future investigations is insufficient to classify a record as protected
under GRAMA. The trial court's ruling amounts to a categorical exception for all
investigative reports - a sweeping policy decision that the Legislature has never made,
and a dangerous expansion of permissible government secrecy.
Finally, even if the Report did contain some information that the public is not
entitled to inspect, which it does not, GRAMA requires the County to redact the nonpublic information and release the public information. The trial court erred in failing to
require such redaction.
Because the Report is not properly classified as a private or protected record, it is
public and the Morning News is entitled to judgment ordering its release. The trial court's
decision should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Investigative Report is Presumed to be a Public Record, and it was the
County's Burden Below to Establish its Legal Exemption from Public
Disclosure,
The lodestar of GRAMA is the presumption of public access to government

records. UA record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-201(2) (emphasis added). The Utah Legislature has rooted this presumption
of public access in "the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of
the public's business .. ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(l)(a). Moreover, in enacting
GRAMA, the Legislature expressly declared its intent to "promote the public's right of
easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records;" to "specify those conditions
under which the public interest in restricting access to government records may outweigh
the public's interest in access;" to "prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental
entities by permitting confidential treatment of records only as provided in this chapter;"
and to "favor public access" in cases "where countervailing interests are of equal weight.
. . ." Id. § 63-2-101(3).
Utah's strong public policy favoring access to information concerning the conduct
of the public's business - as reflected in GRAMA and its statutory predecessors - has
long been recognized by this Court. In KUTVInc. v. Utah St. Bd. ofEduc, 689 P.2d
1357 (Utah 1984), the Court stated that "[t]he presumption in cases such as this has
always been public access, subject only to specific statutory restrictions, personal privacy
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rights, and countervailing public policy

The Court recognizes that it is the policy of

this state that public records be kept open for public inspection in order to prevent secrecy
in public affairs." Id. at 1361; see also Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah
1980) ("Both our state and federal constitutions contain assurances as to freedom of
information and expression

We regard it as in conformity with the law, and wise as

a matter of policy, to require disclosure of information in which the public has an interest.
. . . " ) ; Deputy Sheriffs Mut. Aid Ass yn of Salt Lake Co. v. Salt Lake Co. Deputy Sheriffs
Merit Comm % 466 P.2d 836, 837 (Utah 1970) ("We believe and hold that they are public
writings and that those interested should be able to examine them. This conclusion seems
to reflect the intention of the legislature. . . .").
Because of the statutory presumption of access to government records, it was the
County's burden below to come forward with evidence establishing that the specific
record in question - the Investigative Report - is^pressly exempt |rom public disclosure
under GRAMA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(2) ("A record is public unless otherwise
expressly provided by statute."); KUTV, 689 P.2d at 1361 (interpreting the statutory
predecessor to GRAMA); see also United States v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)
(holding under analogous federal FOIA statute that "the strong presumption in favor of
disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested
documents"). Failure of the non-moving party on summary judgment to come forward
with evidence "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
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case" entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson Dev. Co. v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 23,116 P-2d 323 (internal quotation omitted).
As demonstrated in the following sections, the trial court erred in concluding that
the Investigative Report is properly classified as private or protected under GRAMA
because the County failed to present facts establishing that such classification was proper.
Because the County failed to rebut the statutory presumption of public access to the
Investigative Report, the Morning News is entitled to summary judgement declaring the
Report a public record.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Independent Investigative
Report Is a Private Record Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d).
The trial court's application of Section 302(2)(d) contains two different errors.

First, the trial court failed to give any consideration to the public interest in release of the
Report. Such consideration is necessary to determine whether an invasion of privacy is
"clearly unwarranted," as GRAMA requires. Second, the trial court's conclusion that
release of the Report would unjustly invade the privacy of Floros - the perpetrator whose
official misconduct was substantiated by the Report - has no basis in logic, law, or fact.
Floros has no "privacy right" to conceal his substantiated sexual harassment of
subordinate County employees, and there is no evidence in the record that release of the
Report would unjustly invade the privacy of anyone else. The trial court's conclusion that
the Report is a "private record" is erroneous and should be reversed.
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A.

The Trial Court Failed to Give Any Consideration to the Public
Interest in Release of the Report

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d), a record may properly be classified
as private only if it "contain[s] data on individuals the disclosure of which constitutes a
clearly unwarranted invasion of p^rsonal^riva^." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d).
Because this exception only protects against the disclosure of data on individuals that
would cause a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy, it clearly does not
preclude public access to all records that contain udata on individuals."3 Rather, the
statute necessarily requires government entities to balance the "public's right of access to
information concerning the conduct of the public's business" against "the right of privacy
in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2102(1).
Where, for example, the record concerns the conduct or misconduct of public
officials, expenditure of public funds, or other "conduct of the public's business," as the
Report does here, the public interest in disclosure is high. In such cases, the disclosure of
information in the record that might prove embarrassing or nettlesome to public officials,

3

To read the statute so broadly would eviscerate the statutory presumption of
access and secrete a multitude of government records that contain information about
individuals but which are public under GRAMA, including, for example, police reports,
arrest warrants, occupational and professional licenses, and notices of agency action. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(3) ("The following records are normally public, but to the
extent a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, access may be restricted under . ..
Section 63-2-302[.]").
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and which they may prefer to keep secret, nevertheless may be warranted. See, e.g.,
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (1980) (ordering disclosure of salary information of
state higher education employees notwithstanding claim of privacy invasion).
The trial court, however, failed to give any consideration to the substantial public
interests favoring disclosure of the Investigative Report. (R. 593-602; see also Tab D to
Addendum). Had it done so, there is no question that the significant public interest in
disclosure of the Report would have outweighed any privacy interests at stake. This is so
for at least three reasons.
First, the Report not only concerns the conAicLo£-the^pubhc' s business^ it goes to
the heart of it. The Report concerns allegations that a high-ranking Salt Lake County
official engaged in egregious and persistent sexual harassment of subordinate employees
and that County officials knew about such misconduct and continued to employ him. (R.

,t^

\<

^

^ 314 at viii (citing R. 329); R. 441; R. 353-54; R. 371; see also R. 127-28 & attachment

/I^rvnjf

4 & thereto). Although the full content of the Report remains secret from the public, the
partial summary contained in the Soltis Letter reveals that the Report (i) substantiates
Rice's complaint against Floros, (ii) finds that Floros had sexually harassed Rice and
punished her for not reciprocating his advances, and (iii) recommends that Floros be
immediately terminated and considered ineligible for employment with the County. (R.
314 at xxi (citing R. 330)). The public obviously has a compellingTnterest injeaming
what the independent investigators found regarding the nature and extent of such
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misconduct, what County managers knew about it, and what actions, if any, County
managers took in response to it.
v Second, the public has a compelling interest in scrutinizing theprocess that
produced the Report. The District Attorney's handling of the Floros investigation was a
matter of considerable public interest and controversy. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R.
322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). To allay fears of political cronyism and bias, and to
"maintain complete objectivity and fair play," the District Attorney commissioned an
independent panel of outside attorneys to investigate the allegations against Floros and
report their findings, conclusions, and recommendations. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)).
The Report is the product of that independent investigation. In this respect, the Report is
significantly different than other, more routine internal investigative reports of alleged
sexual harassment in the government workplace. Without access to the content of the
Report, members of the public, including County employees who are entitled to a
workplace free from sexual harassment, are left in the dark concerning whether the
investigation was, in fact, objective, fair and thorough. The incomplete summary of the
investigators' findings and recommendations contained in the Soltis Letter is wholly
inadequate for this purpose. Release of the Report would provide a valuable public check
on the integrity of the independent investigation and promote the public accountability of
the elected officials responsible for the investigation, including, specifically, District
Attorney Yocum and County Clerk Swensen.
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VThirov the Report, which the District Attorney's Office characterized as "very well
reasoned, fair and complete/' is the product of 100 hours of investigation and the
expenditure of approximately $11,000 in taxpayer funds. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 239); see
also R. 340 & Tab 2 thereto). In addition to the significant public interest in learning
about official misconduct and promoting the accountability of public officials responsible
for its investigation, the public has a right to see how its tax dollars are being spent. See,
e.g., Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1980) ("It seems to us that there is
even a greater potential for evil in permitting public funds to be expended secretly.. . We
regard it as in conformity with the law, and wise as a matter of policy, to require
disclosure of information in which the public has an interest....").
As demonstrated below, these significant public interests favoring disclosure of the
Investigative Report clearly outweigh the privacy interests, if any, implicated by the
Report. Given the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record before it, the trial
court erred in concluding otherwise.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Release of the Report Would
Constitute a Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of Floros' Personal
Privacy.

Perhaps the most unusual conclusion in the trial court's decision is the holding that
Floras has a personal privacy interest in concealing his misconduct as a public official -
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an argument that the County did not even attempt below.4 Even stranger, the court
reached this conclusion not because it found that the Report contained baseless
allegations against Floros, but rather because the Report substantiated Rice's allegations
of official misconduct. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-30)). The court explained its
reasoning as follows:
Reason dictates that there exists within the contents of the full investigative
report more express information concerning the alleged perpetrator [Floros]
than exists in the Soltis letter, and more even-handed findings than can be
found in the allegations contained in the [Marcia Rice] federal [lawsuit] or
EEOC complaints. This is information, unique to the investigative report,
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
the alleged perpetrator's privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
The trial court's conclusion is obviously in error. It is not an invasion of personal
privacy to disclose the misconduct of a public official, much less the "clearly
unwarranted" invasion required by GRAMA. The Report is not an expose on Floros'
personal life. It concerns misconduct that occurred while Floros was acting in his official
capacity as the Chief Deputy Clerk and his alleged abuse of that office to harass County
employees. Floros has no reasonable expectation of privacy in concealing such conduct
from the public. Numerous courts from other states have affirmed this principle in
upholding release of investigative reports involving allegations of official misconduct.

4

The County instead argued that the Report should be kept secret to protect the
privacy of witnesses interviewed for the Report, an assertion that also fails for reasons
discussed below.
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See, e.g. Fincher v. Georgia, 497 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming release
of an investigatory report in a sexual harassment case involving a public employee
because the "public interest in obtaining the information outweighed [the accused's]
privacy interest"); Antell v. Attorney Gen., 752 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001)
("[T]he public interest in disclosing allegations of official misconduct at the conclusion of
an investigation generally outweighs the privacy interests of participants in a cold
investigation/'); Citizens to Recall Mayor James Whitlock v. Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74, 78
(Mont. 1992) (holding that because public officials "occupy unique positions in regard to
expectation of privacy/'disclosure of investigation into public official's alleged sexual
harassment did not violate his right to privacy); Local 2849 v. Rock County, 689 N.W.2d
644, 654-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming release of investigatory records detailing law
enforcement officers' use of department computers to view inappropriate images because
officers' interest in privacy did not overcome "strong public interest in obtaining
information regarding their activities while on duty").
This distinction between private and public conduct is reflected in the County's
own GRAMA Ordinance, which favors public disclosure of records when the information
sought concerns "public figures" or government workings and activities. See S.L. Co.
Ord. 2050 §§ 4.5.3 and 4.5. 4. (R. 446).
Moreover, the fact the Investigative Report contains more "even-handed" (i.e.,
credible) findings than the allegations contained in Rice's federal court or EEOC
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complaints, which are already a matter of public record, undermines, rather than supports,
the trial court's conclusion that release of the Report would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of Floros' personal privacy. The public interest in learning about the more
"even-handed" findings contained in the Investigative Report - a report the District
Attorney's Office characterized as "very well reasoned, fair and complete" - is certainly
equal to if not greater than its interest in learning about the bare allegations themselves.
This is particularly so in light of the fact the independent investigators substantiated
Rice's allegations, found that Floros had committed "egregious violations" of County
policy, and would have recommended his immediate termination had he not resigned just
days before the Report was issued. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 330)).
GRAMA's privacy exception was never meant to shield official misconduct from
the public view. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was erroneous and should be
reversed.
C.

There is No Evidence that Disclosure of the Investigative Report Would
Constitute a Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of Any Other Person's
Privacy.

There is no other privacy interest that warrants classification of the Report as a
private record. First, with respect to Rice, she has already disclosed her identity and made
public the details of the alleged harassment. Her Notice of Claim against the County, the
public EEOC Determination, and her complaint in federal court contain extensive, highly
personal details concerning the alleged sexual harassment. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-
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42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 355-73)). In addition, after filing her Notice of Claim,
Rice's attorney made statements to the press about Rice's claim. (R. 341-42; R. 350-52 ).
In making these disclosures and seeking damages and redress for her injury in the public
courts, Rice has relinquished any privacy interest she may have had in the information
contained in the Report. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 35573)).
Moreover, the fact that Rice never intervened and objected to disclosure of the
Report during three County administrative appeal proceedings or in the court proceedings
below demonstrates, at a minimum, that Rice is not averse to public disclosure of
information concerning the misconduct of which she was a victim.
Second, with respect to County Clerk Swensen, disclosure of the Report would not
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of her personal privacy because she is an elected
County official and the Report concerns conduct that occurred in her office and on her
watch. See cases cited supra at 24-25. Swensen has no legitimate privacy interest in
preventing public scrutiny of her office or the conduct of her Chief Deputy. As
demonstrated above, release of the Report will shed considerable light on the conduct of
the public's business, and the public interest in disclosure is compelling.
Finally, with respect to the other witnesses interviewed for the Report, there is no
evidence that any witness has objected to disclosure. Indeed, at least two County
employees interviewed by investigators - Amy DaSilva and Audrey Sharpsteen - have
-27185229 2

stated they support release of the Report to prevent retaliation against witnesses who
cooperated with investigators and to shed light on Floros' conduct and the workings of
the County Clerk's Office. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amicus Curiae Amy DaSilva and Audrey Sharpsteen (Oct. 5, 2006) at 3.
Moreover, for reasons that will become obvious to the Court upon review of the Report,
and which are discussed in the Morning News' Sealed Submission, release of the Report
would not cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of any of these
individuals. See Morning News' Sealed Submission at 9-12.
In sum, the County failed to present evidence on summary judgment sufficient to
conclude that disclosure of the Report would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy," as required under Section 302(2)(d). The trial court's conclusion
that release of the Report would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of Floros'
personal privacy is wholly unsupported by the record, erroneous as a matter of law, and
should be reversed.
III.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Independent Investigative
Report Was a Protected Record Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9).
The only other basis for the trial court's refusal to release the Report is its

conclusion that the Report is a "protected" record under Section 304(9) of GRAMA.
That section provides protected status for the following records if properly classified:
records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative
enforcement purposes, if release of the records:
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(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations undertaken
for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or
enforcement proceedings; .. .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9) (emphasis added).
At the time the Morning News submitted its GRAMA request for the Investigative
Report, the independent investigation had concluded; Floros had retired from County
employment; the District Attorney had reported the investigators' summary of findings
and disposition to Rice, concluding that "administrative-disciplinary action" was
unnecessary; and Rice had filed her federal civil rights lawsuit against the County, Floros
and Swensen. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-31); R. 314 at xxv-xxvi (citing R. 3, 28)).
Accordingly, release of the Report could not interfere with investigation or disciplinary
proceedings related to Floros, as the trial court found. (R. 598-99).
The investigation of Floros, however, was the only investigation specified in the
record. The County presented no evidence of any other specific investigation that would
be compromised by release of the Report; indeed, it presented no evidence of any other
investigation at all. Instead, the County proposed a sweeping expansion of Section
304(9), one which does not require evidence of any actual investigation. According to the
County's interpretation, a record can be classified asjjrotected based solely on the chance
that its release might interfere with some hypothetical investigation some time in the
future. Based on this speculation, the County claimed that Section 304(9) applied.
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Remarkably, the trial court accepted the County's argument. It di<i not require any
evidence of an actual investigation that would be compromised by release of the Report,
nor did it analyze whether release of this Report would interfere with future
investigations.5 Instead, the court saw itself as issuing a categorical ruling on all sexual
harassment investigative reports, stating that, "in the public's eyes," a determination that
this specific Investigative Report was public "carries an implication that there is a chance
that all such investigative reports could be made public as well, depending upon how
badly the information is wanted," thus possibly chilling the participation of witnesses and
victims in some future, hypothetical sexual harassment investigation. (R. 600).
The trial court's interpretation is a faeathtakinj^xpansion of the investigation
exception, and it should be rejected by this Court for at least two reasons: (1) it facilitates
unjust government secrecy based on nothing more than speculation, as numerous courts
interpreting the analogous provision of the federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
have concluded; and (2) it creates a categorical exception for all sexual harassment
investigative reports, which is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the courts.

5

Ironically, in this case, the opposite is more likely true. Public disclosure of the
Investigative Report is more likely to foster confidence among the public and County
employees that the County takes allegations of sexual harassment seriously, investigates
them thoroughly, and holds public officials accountable for their conduct. This is
particularly so where, as here, the alleged perpetrator is a high-ranking County official
accused of harassing subordinates. Victims and witnesses are more likely to come
forward and report sexual harassment if they see evidence that the County takes seriously
sexual harassment allegations against such officials and investigates them thoroughly.
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A.

Section 304(9) is Limited to Pending or Contemplated Investigations or
Proceedings.

In Badran v. United Sates, 652 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (N.D. 111. 1987), Badran, an
immigrant, filed suit under FOIA to obtain disclosure of all of the documents in her
immigration file, including a report of the INS's investigation of her case. The
government denied access to the investigative report under an exemption in FOIA
analogous to Section 304(9) of GRAMA, which exempted from disclosure "investigatory
records compiled by law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production
of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings[.]" 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(A).
Like the County here, the INS conceded that no pending or contemplated
enforcement proceeding would be endangered by release of the INS investigative report.
It nevertheless argued that the classification was proper because the report contained
information that the INS "could use against a person who might someday violate
immigration laws." Badran, 652 F. Supp. at 1440.
The Badran court had little difficulty rejecting this argument:
This position is bewildering and indefensible. An agency may not assert the
"enforcement proceedings" exception to FOIA "when there is no
enforcement proceeding then pending or contemplated." No court has ever
held to the contrary. If an agency could withhold information whenever it
could imagine circumstances where the information might have some
bearing on some hypothetical enforcement proceeding, the FOIA would be
meaningless; all information could fall into that category. The INS must
disclose the Report of Investigation.
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Id. (citations omitted).
Numerous other courts have agreed. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 230-32, 98 S. Ct. 2311 (1978) (emphasizing that Congress did not
intend for the "enforcement proceedings" exception to "endlessly protect material simply
because it was in an investigatory file"); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep 't of Energy,
617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that "enforcement proceedings" exception
only exempts from disclosure information that is "still under investigation or being
actively pursued," not "yellowing documents contained in long-closed files"); Nat'I Sec.
Archive v. F.B.I., 759 F. Supp. 872, 883 (D.D.C. 1991) (concluding that "enforcement
proceedings" exception "cannot justify withholding unless the material withheld relate[s]
to a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The reasoning in Badran and other cases construing the FOIA exception is equally
applicable here. A government entity relying on Section 304(9) to deny access to a record
on the ground that it would interfere with an investigation or proceeding must identify a
pending or contemplated investigation that would be interfered with by release of the
record. There was no concrete investigation or proceeding at issue in this case and
therefore the exception does not apply. To read the exception otherwise, and as the trial
court did below, would allow any record relating to "civil, criminal, or administrative
enforcement purposes" to be concealed because release of any such record could
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hypothetically chill the participation of victims and witnesses in such investigations or
proceedings. Such a construction would render GRAMA, and its presumption of public
access to government records, meaningless.
B.

The Trial Court's Interpretation Creates a Categorical Exception for
All Sexual Harassment Investigative Reports,

The trial court's interpretation is not only improvident as a matter of government
secrecy, it is also flawed analytically. GRAMA requires access determinations to be
made on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific record in question and whether its
release would cause harm to those countervailing public interests expressly identified in
the exceptions to public disclosure. It does not ask the court to create categorical
exceptions or decide the fate of all similar records. That, however, is precisely what the
trial court did in this case, asserting that a determination that this specific Investigative
Report was public "carries an implication that there is a chance that all such investigative
reports could be made public as well, depending upon how badly the information is
wanted[.]" (R. 600). From this "implication" of a "chance," the trial court concluded that
release of the Report might chill witnesses who want confidentiality from participating in
future investigations, and thus the Report is a protected record.6

6

Significantly, the County presented no evidence that the independent
investigators in this case promised confidentiality to any witnesses or that the
investigators ever expected the Report to remain confidential. (R. 555). In fact, for
reasons explained in the Morning News' Sealed Submission, the content of the Report
supports the opposite conclusion.
-33185229 2

If that is all that Section 304(9) requires, then no sexual harassment investigative
report would ever be released. Indeed, no investigative report of any nature would be
released, since the government could always raise the "chance" that a future investigation
might occur, and future witnesses might know about this particular ruling, and those
witnesses might be chilled from participating if they happen to want confidentiality.
Even worse, the trial court implied that this categorical secrecy classification would exist
indefinitely, "irrespective of the passage of time, and the change of circumstances." (R.
599).
While putting all investigative reports off limits to the public forever may arguably
be a plausible policy decision, that is a policy choice for the Legislature, not the courts.
The Legislature did not make that choice in GRAMA. Under GRAMA, "[a]ll records are
public unless expressly classified otherwise by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(2)
(emphasis added). There is no provision in GRAMA expressly classifying as non-public
investigative reports of sexual harassment in government workplaces, much less
classifying as non-public the independently commissioned Investigative Report at issue
here.
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In this case, there is no evidence that release of this specific Report would interfere
in any way with any specific investigation. Given this lack of evidence, the trial court's
conclusion that Section 304(9) applies is erroneous and should be reversed.7
IV.

The Content of the Independent Investigative Report Supports the
Conclusion that it is a Public Record.
[See "SEALED SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT CONCERNING CONTENT OF

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT" (Submitted Under Seal).]
V.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Redact any Non-Public Information in
the Report and Release the Public Information.
Finally, even if there were some part of the Report that contained information to

which the public is not entitled, which there is not, GRAMA requires the County to
segregate information to which the public is entitled and release that information. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-307. Neither the County nor the trial court made any attempt to do so

7

The County argued half-heartedly below that its concealment of the
Investigative Report also was proper under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-2-304(17), which
protect records constituting attorney work-product. (R. 555 at 6-7). The trial court did
not rely on this exception in upholding the County's nondisclosure, and the exception
clearly is inapplicable to the Report. The County admitted that the Report was prepared
pursuant to the County's sexual harassment policy, not in preparation for litigation with
Rice. (R. 555 at xxi, f 4; see also R. 314 at xvii (citing R. 127-28 & attachment thereto at
17; id. at 1). The Report does not contain the legal impression of attorneys preparing a
litigation defense but rather reports the findings of an independent investigation of
alleged sexual harassment by a County official. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)). And, if that
were not obvious enough, the County's disclosure of the Report to Rice and her counsel
during the federal court litigation is patently inconsistent with the County's after-the-fact
assertion that the Report constitutes attorney work-product. (R. 314 at xxv (citing R. 15973); R. 134 n. 2).
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in this case, instead insisting that the entire Report should be kept secret. Should this
Court determine there is some information in the Report to which the public is not
entitled, the Court should order redaction of such information and release the remainder
of the Report pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-307.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those contained in the Morning News' Sealed
Submission, the Memorandum Decision of the trial court should be reversed, and the
matter remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Morning News.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this

12. .day of October 2006.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Jeffrey 1-Hunt I 1 [M
"Btavid Q. Reymanir
Mich^eljT. Hoppe
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Deseret Morning News
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